University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Other Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1979

Introduction to Book IV
Thomas A. Green

Michigan School of Law, tagreen@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other/222

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure
Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Green, Thomas A. Introduction to Of Public WrongsWilliam Blackstone, iii-xvi. Commentaries on the Laws
of England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. (A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765-1769.)

This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Other Publications by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Commentaries
on the
Laws of Eng land
William Blackstone
A Facsimile of the First Edition
ofl 765-1769
VOLUME IV

Of
Public Wrongs
(I 769)
With an Introduction by Thomas A. Green

The University of Chicago Press

Chicago & London

COMMENTARIES
0 N

L

TH B

w s

A
OF

ENGLAND.
B O O K TH E

F OU RT H.

BY

WI LLIAM

B L A C K S T O N E,

Es~

S O L I C I TO R G EN E RA L TO HE R M A J E STY.

0

X

F

O

R

D,

PR I N T E D AT THE C LARE N D O N PRE S S.

M. D C C. L X IX.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK IV

THE final volume of Blackstone's Commentaries sets forth a·lucid
survey of crime and criminal procedure informed by those propositions concerning English law and the relations between man and
state that characterize the entire work. Perhaps no area of the law
so tested Blackstone's settled and complacent views as did the
criminal law, particularly the large and growing body of statutory
capital crimes. In the end, Blackstone failed to demonstrate that
English criminal law reflected a coherent set of principles, but his
intricate and often internally contradictory attempt nevertheless
constitutes a classic description of that law, and can still be read
as such. Blackstone struggled to reconcile the severity of the criminal law with what he saw as the essentially humane inspiration of
English law in general, and in this he was a man of his age. Moreover, he sought to show that, in practice, English criminal justice
accorded with the principles of certainty and proportionality of
punishment invoked by the leading Continental penal reformers.
His recognition of the gulf between the ideal and the reality, however, led him to cast his introductory statement,1 and much that
followed, as a heartfelt, though muted and deferential, plea for
reform of the laws of crimes and punishments.
In organization and coverage Blackstone's last volume is the least
original of the four. It draws heavily upon earlier treatises on the
pleas of the Crown, principally those by Hale 2 in the late seventeenth century and Hawkins 3 in the early eighteenth century, both
of whom also dealt first with substantive crimes and then with
criminal procedure. The sections on noncapital crimes, particularly
those on offenses against the Crown, religion and public justice,
and peace and trade, appear to borrow from Thomas Wood's An
Institute of the Laws of England,4 first published in 1720. Nevertheless, Blackstone's treatment far surpasses all earlier works on
English criminal law. It is both comprehensive and unified, not
only stating the law as it then stood, but also providing a philosophical setting and historical background for the criminal law.
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What gives his work a special force and unity is Blackstone's insistence that criminal law ought to be "founded upon principles
that are permanent, uniform and universal; and always conformable to the dictates of truth and justice, the feelings of humanity,
and the indelible rights of mankind." 5 These principles of natural
law and justice are invoked both to explain and to defend English
law. Blackstone did not consider all legal rules and prohibitions
to be propositions of natural law. He followed convention in characterizing those that expressed moral as well as legal commands
as mala in se, but he recognized that there were as many or more
mala prohibita, or mere positive commands. As to these, the moral
claim to obedience arose only as an incident to society's right to
create the duty, a right that flowed from the social compact. 6
The procedures of criminal law belonged to this class of positive
commands that derived their force from consent. But Blackstone
sought to show that English criminal procedure, too, was consonant
with principles of natural justice. In design and measure, it was
suited to effect the purpose of all punishment: to serve as "a precaution against future offenses of the same kind," 7 whether by
correction or physical restraint of an offender or by deterrence of
other, potential offenders.
Blackstone understood that, in its fortuitous provenance or unreasonable severity, much of the letter of English law was hard to
justify by recourse to theories of natural justice, consent, or deterrence. Accordingly, he placed considerable weight upon those
aspects of the actual application of the law that tended to reduce
its inhumanity: natural justice was achieved through merciful application of the law. Blackstone largely suppressed his concern that
a system which corrected for its cruelty by ad hoc recourse to
mechanisms for excusing from punishment might sacrifice something both of the principle of certainty of punishment and of the
related end of deterrence. 8 But even as he extolled the virtues of
royal pardons and defended "pious perjury," he revealed his belief
that English criminal law stood in considerable tension and in
need of substantial reform. 9

The Substantive Law of Crimes
Blackstone's introductory chapter on the substantive law of
crimes, couched as a discussion of persons capable of committing
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criminal acts, stresses the importance of free will. It is "the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the
fact in question," that "renders human actions either praiseworthy
or culpable." 10 Men are free, their social obligations derived from
a freely given consent to social existence. But men have not consented to be punished for involuntary acts or acts of pure necessity.
Blackstone saw, however, that the will theory could be used to resist much of the substantive law: might not poverty, he asks,
ground a defense of involuntarism or of necessity, especially in
cases of theft of food and clothing? Blackstone replies that property
would be rendered insecure by the alleged wants of others, "of
which wants no man can possibly be an adequate judge, but the
party himself who pleads them." 11 In any case, he continues, in
England there is no need for such self-help, as the poor were
provided for by civil magistrates. Finally, and characteristically,
in a more sympathetic reflection on the problem Blackstone invokes the power of the Crown "to soften the law, and to extend
mercy in cases of peculiar hardship." 12
Blackstone's treatment of specific crimes surveys three kinds of
offenses: offenses against God and religion; offenses directly against
the state, comprising those against the Crown and the prerogative
or against justice (broadly, obstructing justice), those against public peace (riots, affrays, and libels), and those against public trade
and public health and economy; and finally offenses against the
person, habitation, and private property generally. In his discussion of each kind of offense, Blackstone deals first with felony,
then with misdemeanor. There is no systematic segregation of the
historic pleas of the Crown from the more recent statutorily created offenses, and the unity of the entire work is thereby enh,:inced.13 There are degrees of criminality, but all crimes, whether
statutory or common law, are first and foremost breaches of the
social bonds men have consented to protect.
For Blackstone, vertical lines of authority and obedience were
in the natural order of things. Those offenses against God and
religion over which secular authorities had jurisdiction were
attacks upon the ultimate source of authority in human society.
Although eager to assert that the laws concerning Roman Catholics
were "seldom exerted to their utmost rigor" (they were relics
of "the urgency of the times which produced them"), 14 Blackstone was passionately anti-Papist. He scorned what he cal!ed the
"slavish, blind devotion" of the Catholics to their Church, con-
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trasting to it the "due obedience" that the Church of England
inculcated: "The most stable foundation of legal and rational government is due subordination of rank, and a gradual scale of authority .... " 15 Catholicism, like the opposite excess of democracy,
represented a perversion of the natural order.
In his discussion of treason, Blackstone strikes a similar note,
characterizing the offense as an act of betrayal and treachery that
strikes at the heart of social bonds and suspends all measure of
affection otherwise due a person from those of higher station. High
treason, an offense against majesty, is therefore the highest of
crimes. Nevertheless, Blackstone warns that the very seriousness
of the offense requires that it be "the most precisely ascertained." 16
History taught that too great a latitude in the power to define
treasonous acts was an invitation to arbitrary and despotic government.
Blackstone's chapters on offenses against public justice, peace,
trade, and health describe much of the vast misdemeanor jurisdiction of the justices of the peace that had been steadily increasing
since the fourteenth century. The reader need only glance at the
table of contents in order to sense the extent to which regulatory
law pervaded politics, enterprise, and morals in the eighteenth
century. The Elizabethan obsession with public order and the consequent management of private behavior had hardly abated by
Blackstone's day. Blackstone shared the assumptions of the rulers
of his tightly knit and closely regulated society. His paternalism
and prudery were virtually unbounded. He thus insists upon the
highest standards from public officials and from the practicing
bar; 17 details with evident approbation the myriad prohibitions
against even the most minor causes of public disorder; 18 and excoriates public nuisances of every sort, reserving his most moralistic
tone for gaming, horse racing, and private lotteries, which tended
"by necessary consequences to promote public idleness, theft, and
debauchery" among the poor. 19 For Blackstone the virtues of
industriousness, thrift, and common decency were more than ends
in themselves: they were instrumental to the security of the
property, liberty, and persons of all subjects of the realm.
In treating offenses against person and property, Blackstone pays
careful attention both to the law in practice and to the theoretical
distinctions between the capital and the noncapital forms of these
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crimes. He does not merely explain and defend; where appropriate, he is critical and counsels reform. The distinction between
murder and manslaughter, or between capital and noncapital
homicide, was a product of the sixteenth century. At the core of
"murder" lay the concept of malice aforethought, but murder had
even by Coke's day been further complicated by the concept of
"implied malice." 20 Blackstone appears to approve of the law of
implied malice. Moreover he offers only muted criticism of the
presumption of murder in cases of a mother's concealment of the
death of her child. 21 The discussion of noncapital homicide is comprehensive. He strongly endorses the law of justifiable homicide
(e.g., slaying to prevent the commission of a serious crime), finding
precedent for it in Jewish, Roman, and Greek law. Truly excusable homicide, whether committed in self-defense or through nonnegligent accident, also merits acquittal. Thus it appears from
Blackstone's discussion that the courts were now acquitting outright those who earlier had to obtain a royal pardon. The line between true self-defense and manslaughter is defended despite its
fuzziness. It most often depends on the question of retreat, he
states, and the defendant's retreat is not a fiction, but results "from
a real tenderness of shedding his brother's blood." 22
Blackstone thus took the complex law of homicide much as he
found it, endorsing both its strict rules of capital murder and its
subtle gradations in noncapital forms. The distinctions were subtle
but rational and to be taken seriously. It was for the prisoner
to make out the "circumstances of justification, excuse or alleviation ... to the satisfaction of the court and jury." 23
The law of theft, by contrast, was altogether too severe. The unlawful taking of property worth twelve pence or more was capital.
Thus the scope of capital theft had always been broad, and it had
expanded steadily with inflation. Furthermore, a profusion of
statutes, of which the Black Act of 1723 is only the most notorious,24 created dozens of other capital felonies for threats to or destruction of property. 25 Blackstone questions the wisdom of capital punishment in such cases, citing More and Beccaria for the
view that imprisonment with the obligation to labor and make
restitution was the preferable sanction. He endorses the tendency
of juries to undervalue goods, where only inflation had made a
theft capital. For a jury to do so in other cases of theft, he states,
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is to indulge in "a kind of pious perjury"; he appears to regard
such behavior as a lesser evil and as an indication of the need for
reform of the law. 26

Criminal Procedure
In Blackstone's discussion of substantive law we see the imprint
of his political and social theory. We also see his pronounced bent
toward comparative inquiry, albeit on a superficial level; he frequently defends English doctrines by reference to similar practices
in ancient and in contemporary Continental legal systems. By contrast, his treatment of procedure is more historical than theoretical, and it is decidedly insular. Blackstone is quick to condemn
long-vanished or vestigial English practices, drawing at once the
two lessons of the barbarism and irrationality of much medieval
procedure and the enlightened progress of his own day.
Blackstone stresses the importance of the principle that prevention is preferable to punishment, emphasizing thereby both
humaneness and deterrence. 27 Like his contemporaries, he took for
granted the role of justices of the peace in receiving complaints
and requiring those complained of to produce sureties for their
good behavior, practices that long predated but were substantially
increased by Tudor vagrancy legislation. 28 Although Blackstone
concedes that the magistrates' discretionary power was very great
in this area, he indicates little concern about it. 29 Here, as elsewhere, his preoccupation with the maintenance of public order
surfaces; the specter of riot and pilferage haunts the volume on
public wrongs.
Blackstone is nevertheless scrupulously consistent in distinguishing punishment from what he considers prevention. He countenances cooperation with the modern forms of the ancient system
of frankpledge as integral to one's natural social obligation; failure
to make good on these obligations justifies restraints on liberty.
Punishment for commission of a crime, on the other hand, requires
sound proof. Blackstone insists upon rigorous adherence to the
rules of arrest, committal, and bail: justices must state precisely
the cause for apprehending a suspect and must grant him his freedom, on recognizance and pending trial, save in those few most
serious cases where pretrial incarceration was necessary. 30 Similarly,
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Blackstone states that indictment should not be treated casually,
that the grand jury "ought to be thoroughly persuaded of the
truth of an indictment .... " 31 He defends the legality of informations, so long as they are supported by "express direction from the
court of kings bench," 32 but inveighs against their former abuse by
Star Chamber and at common law.
Blackstone's defense of jury trial as a safeguard against unjust
restraints upon the liberty of the accused33 is of a piece with his
endorsement of strict rules regarding committal and indictment.
He approves the disposition of the bench to discourage defendants
from confessing their guilt; they should be urged to plead to the
indictment and stand trial. 34 Blackstone approves of the liberal
right to challenge jurors allowed to the defendant, but he fails to
mention that actual practice was not nearly so liberal. 35
Blackstone has surprisingly little to say about the nature of the
criminal trial. He shows little awareness of contemporary changes
that were making the trial a highly structured formal proceeding.
Well into the eighteenth century, the typical felony trial was much
like the one that Thomas Smith had described nearly two centuries
before. 36 The trial was in large measure an altercation between
accusing witnesses and the defendant himself. The bench interceded with questions of its own, commented freely upon the evidence, and frequently tried to influence the jury in its verdict. By
Blackstone's time, however, a virtual transformation in trial procedure was under way. Blackstone was not alert to the slow rise of
the law of criminal evidence. He overstates the role of counsel,
perhaps generalizing from private law, which he knew from firsthand experience, and from the state trials. Blackstone believed that
judges had "seldom scruple[d]" to allow counsel both to advise the
accused on questions of law and "even to ask questions for him,
with respect to matters of fact." 37 In truth, counsel had only very
recently come to play this role and were thus only beginning to
have a dramatic impact on the criminal trial. 38

The Problem of Merciful Application of the Law
The grounds for appealing a conviction were in Blackstone's day
still very narrow: writs of error lay only for errors on the face of
the record, for instance, "notorious mistakes in the judgment" or
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"other less palpable errors" in the formal record. In capital cases
the writ issued ex gratia, not as a matter of course. 39 This system
was tempered by a bench that not infrequently exercised a discretionary power to reprieve a sentence and to recommend to the
Crown either an absolute or a conditional pardon. The bench
might act not only for errors in form but also, states Blackstone,
"where the judge is not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence
is suspicious, ... or sometimes if it be a small felony, or any favorable circumstances appear in the criminal's character .... " 40 The
resulting disparity between the letter of the capital penal statutes
and actual sentencing policy has been noted by modern scholars. 41
Blackstone, too, remarked it; indeed, it posed for him the central
problem of English criminal law.
Blackstone approved of the royal power to pardon, which was
as old as kingship itself and integral to the sacred royal duty to extend mercy where mercy is due. 42 At the same time, he sought to
demonstrate that English law embodied the principle of certainty
of punishment to which contemporary Continental publicists gave
so much weight. Noting that Beccaria opposed pardons because of
their intrinsically discretionary nature, Blackstone argues that the
English position was correct. Without royal pardons, judges and
juries would take upon themselves the "dangerous power ... of
construing the criminal law by the spirit instead of the letter." 43
Better to place the necessary power to mitigate in the Crown,
which occupies a station above that of the judiciary. The judge
is thus precluded from contradicting himself, from exercising a
power "to make and to unmake his decisions." 44 In criminal justice, as in much else, Blackstone concluded, monarchy was preferable to democracy: relative certainty of punishment, attention to
individual circumstances, divine mercy, all were possible within
the framework of the English constitution.
It is difficult, if not impossible, for the reader of the discourse on
public wrongs to conclude that Blackstone believed that his description of this aspect of English criminal process accorded with
the actual practice of the day. First, as we have seen, Blackstone
strongly doubted the wisdom and justice of the severity of the law
of theft. Though he much preferred penal reform, until reform
came about he saw no choice but to accept "pious perjury." It is
true that in the text Blackstone is silent about jury nullification
in cases not involving theft, but he was well aware that jury ac-
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quittals were invulnerable to reversal and, following Hale, thought
this a wise policy. 45 Moreover, though he makes no reference to
those judicial jury instructions whose effect was to narrow capital
statutes, he can hardly have been unaware of them; 46 and, as we
have seen, he noted the extensive judicial powers of reprieve.
Blackstone certainly believed that all power of mitigation ought
to reside solely in the Crown, but surely he knew that in fact it
did not.
Blackstone glossed over the serious problems that had been
created by what was widely perceived as an overly severe system
of criminal punishment, but he understood those problems and
sought a remedy for them. Some modern scholars believe that this
very severity of the law provided the ruling classes the critical
leverage of nonenforcement from which they in turn reaped the
gratitude and deference of those they ruled. 47 Yet Blackstone, recognizing the inevitable dangers of dispersed powers of mitigation,
counseled reform. Though he thought some degree of royal mercy
would always be necessary and desirable, he sought, through a
more temperate law, to do away with the need for such mitigation
by judges or at the common level of the jury. In this regard, the
dramatic legal changes wrought in the nineteenth century by Benthamite reform legislation were more consonant than its proponents supposed with Blackstonian principles of criminal justice.48
Blackstone's instinctive conservatism regarding the locus of the
power to mitigate proved, at least in one respect, to be in accord
with the best interests of his class. Though he appears not to have
foreseen the coming storm over the role of the jury in seditious
libel prosecutions, Blackstone avoided for himself the dilemma
posed for other admirers of the jury system who, having endorsed
merciful jury verdicts in common-run felony cases, sanctioned judicial manipulation of the law in order to preclude such jury
verdicts in political cases. 49

Blackstone's Concluding Essay
Blackstone concluded his Commentaries with an essay-a Whig
panegyric-entitled "Of the Rise, Progress and Gradual Improvements of the Laws of England." 50 Sweeping in scope, majestic in
style, this final paean to the elegance, wisdom, and humanity of
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English laws displays both Blackstone the optim1st1c and complacent eighteenth-century gentleman and Blackstone the proponent of measured reform. It was the duty of the nobility and
gentlemen in Parliament "to sustain, to repair, to beautify this
noble pile." 51
The spirit and institutions of the English law, wrote Blackstone,
were the product of three great periods: the Anglo-Saxon, the reign
of Edward I, and the Restoration. The first produced the ancient
constitution and English liberty; the second saw the elaboration
of common law courts and doctrine, the forums and forms of the
law that prevailed in Blackstone's day; the last washed away the
vestiges of Norman enslavement and achieved, in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the means to secure the liberty that Magna Charta
had sought to guarantee centuries before.
Blackstone adhered to the myth of Anglo-Saxon liberties and
heaped scorn on the Norman intruders. But unlike the radical
mid-seventeenth-century law reformers, he did not deprecate the
post-Conquest development of the common law. Rather he saw in
this development the gradual freeing of Englishmen from Norman
tyranny and the establishment of due process and responsible government in the hands of those fit to rule the realm. The Interregnum, by contrast, he reviled as an era of excess. He felt it best
to "pass by the crude and abortive schemes for amending the laws
in the times of confusion which followed [the Civil War]." 52
Blackstone chose to dwell on the law, rather than on the arbitrary abuses of the law, in the Restoration period. He recognized
that the long course of "the recovery of [Englishmen's] civil and
political liberties" was not "fully and explicitly acknowledged and
defined, till the aera of the happy revolution." 53 Like other "Old
Whigs," Blackstone took his stand on the principles invoked and
carried into effect at the time of the Glorious Revolution. 54 He
listed many of the improvements made since that watershed, and
still being made in his own day, but they were for him only inevitable elaborations upon the settlement of 1688-89. Blackstone
put the best possible face even on those eighteenth-century innovations which he opposed. The great increase in capital offenses was
counterbalanced by the merciful "extension of the benefit of
clergy, by abolishing the pedantic criterion of reading," 55 so that
the unlettered, who were ignorant of the law, might have the same
advantages as the learned, of whom more ought to be expected. 56
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Always the apologist, but also the rationalist, Blackstone believed
that knowledge of the law would lead in the end to humaneness,
freedom, and obedience.
THOMAS
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